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ESSAY
DISCOVERY DIVIDE: VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 8.01-
581'S QUALITY ASSURANCE PRIVILEGE AND ITS
PROTECTION OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDER POLICIES
AND INCIDENT REPORTS
Michael L. Goodman *
Kathleen M. McCauley **
Suzanne S. Duvall ***
I. INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, the greatest controversy within the medical mal-
practice litigation community is the limit placed on damage
awards. After numerous challenges, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia ostensibly put the controversy to rest in Pulliam v. Coastal
Emergency Services.' The Pulliam court found that Virginia Code
section 8.01-581.15,2 which established the damage cap, was con-
stitutional.' Such a litigious community, however, could not be
* Partner, Goodman, Allen & Filetti, P.L.L.C., Glen Allen, Virginia. B.A., 1977, J.D.,
1980, University of Virginia. Mr. Goodman specializes in medical malpractice defense and
in the representation of health care providers before the Virginia Department of Health
Professions Board.
** Partner, Goodman, Allen & Filetti, P.L.L.C., Glen Allen, Virginia. B.A., 1990, Col-
lege of William and Mary; J.D., 1995, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University. Ms. McCauley's practice concentrates on medical malpractice defense, hospital
representation, representation before the Commonwealth's health regulatory boards, and
general health care counseling.
*** Former Associate, Goodman, Allen & Filetti, P.L.L.C., Glen Allen, Virginia. B.A.,
1998, J.D., 2002, University of Virginia. Ms. Duvall's practice concentrated on medical
malpractice defense, products liability, and personal injury defense.
1. 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
3. Pulliam, 257 Va. at 7, 509 S.E.2d at 310.
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without controversy for long. Enacted concurrently with the med-
ical malpractice damage cap, Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 -
a sister statute-threatens to divide the medical malpractice
community anew. At the center of the storm is the applicability of
the quality assurance privilege to healthcare provider policies
and incident reports.5
A gaping chasm has developed between the circuit courts (and
occasionally within the same circuit court), centering on a deter-
mination of whether the statute protects healthcare providers'
policies and incident reports from production in discovery. The
controversy's nexus is found in the language of the statute itself,
which is seemingly contradictory, creating an environment in
which courts facing nearly identical issues reach disparate con-
clusions.6
Of the twenty published opinions of Virginia circuit courts
which examine healthcare provider policies, there is an even split
among the circuit courts-ten found them privileged and ten
found them discoverable.7 Of the eighteen published opinions
which considered incident reports, seven ruled the documents
privileged while eleven ruled them discoverable.' Despite the dis-
crepancy in treatment by the circuit courts, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has offered little interpretative guidance, and the Vir-
ginia General Assembly has approved only minimal substantive
revision of the statute. As noted in Saunders v. Gottfried:9
No appellate decisions address the scope of the privilege created by
this section. The circuit courts have split between two distinct lines
of interpretation. The first extends the privilege only to communica-
tions which contain some deliberative content or opinion. Purely fac-
tual reports are not deemed a "communication." The second broader
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
5. See Messerley v. Avante Group, Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26, 26 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Rocking-
ham County); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
6. Compare Head v. INOVA Health Care Servs., 55 Va. Cir. 43 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Fair-
fax County), with Saunders v. Gottfried, 61 Va. Cir. 641 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Chesterfield
County).
7. See infra note 37.
8. See infra note 90. Of the eleven published opinions finding incident reports dis-
coverable, three were handed down by the Honorable John J. McGrath of the Rockingham
County Circuit Court. Consolidating these opinions into one creates a seven-to-nine circuit
split.
9. 61 Va. Cir. 641 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Chesterfield County).
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approach extends the privilege to any report generated for an appro-
priate review committee regardless of its factual content.10
This essay will examine the discoverability of policies and inci-
dent reports under Virginia Code sections 8.01-581.17(B) and (C),
respectively. 1 The logic determining the application of the privi-
lege is discernible.12 This article will consider policies and inci-
dent reports separately.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 8.01-581.17
AND ITS PURPOSE
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 was one of several new laws
adopted in 1976 comprising the Medical Malpractice Act ("Act").' 3
The Act, which included Virginia Code section 8-654.10 (the
predecessor to Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17), was created to
combat practitioners' increasing difficulty in obtaining affordable
medical malpractice insurance.
Whereas, the difficulty, cost and potential unavailability of such in-
surance has caused health care providers to cease providing services
or to retire prematurely and has become a substantial impairment
to health care providers' entering into practice in the Common-
wealth and reduces or will tend to reduce the number of young peo-
ple interested in or willing to enter health care careers; and
Whereas, these factors constitute a significant problem adversely af-
fecting the public health, safety and welfare which necessitates the
imposition of a limitation on the liability of health care providers in
tort actions commonly referred to as medical malpractice cases .... 14
Since its enactment, the General Assembly has not revisited
the purpose of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17. The strongest
recent indication of the statute's goals was enunciated by the Su-
10. Id. at 641-42.
11. In order to prove most beneficial to Virginia practitioners, only published opinions
are considered. There is, however, a wealth of unpublished letter opinions on the topic.
12. On occasion, courts have ruled policies discoverable and incident reports privi-
leged. See Saunders, 61 Va. Cir. at 642; Houchens v. Univ. of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 202, 204
(Cir. Ct. 1991) (Charlottesville City); Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 15 Va. Cir. 352, 355-56 (Cir.
Ct. 1989) (Richmond City). Another court found policies to be privileged while finding inci-
dent reports were discoverable. See Hurdle v. Oceana Urgent Care, 49 Va. Cir. 328, 329
(Cir. Ct. 1999) (Norfolk City).
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.20 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
14. Act of Apr. 9, 1976, ch. 611, 1976 Va. Acts 784.
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preme Court of Virginia in HCA Health Services v. Levin, 5 when
the court stated,
The obvious legislative intent is to promote open and frank discus-
sion during the peer review process among health care providers in
furtherance of the overall goal of improvement of the health care sys-
tem. If peer review information were not confidential, there would be
little incentive to participate in the process.
16
Minor adjustments were made to the statute in 1995, 1997, and
2001 in order to add entities to those included by reference in
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.16.17 The General Assembly's
enlargement of covered entities did not end the disagreement
over the statute's application. There existed little confusion over
who was covered; the problem lay in what was covered.'
Despite a 2002 statutory rearrangement and additions to the
increasing list of covered entities, the General Assembly did not
make changes addressing the discoverability of healthcare poli-
cies and incident reports until 2004.1' The amendment exempted
from the privilege oral communications made to peer review
committees, accreditation entities, professional associations of
healthcare providers, and licensees of managed care health in-
surance plans within twenty-four hours of the incident.2' The
15. 260 Va. 215, 530 S.E.2d 417 (2000).
16. Id. at 221, 530 S.E.2d at 420.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Cum. Supp. 2004). This statute is read in conjunc-
tion with Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 because the groups listed in Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-581.16 are included by reference. Virginia Code section 8.01-581.16 provides civil
immunity for members of a
committee, board, group, commission or other entity [that] has been established
pursuant to federal or state law or regulation, or pursuant to Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations requirements, or established and
duly constituted by one or more public or licensed private hospitals, community
services boards, or behavioral health authorities, or with a governmental agency.
Id.
18. A few courts have considered whether the parent company of the healthcare pro-
vider is afforded vicarious immunity through the quality assurance privilege. These courts
have soundly rejected the concept. See, e.g., Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57, 63 (Cir. Ct.
2003) (Charlottesville City); Levin v. WJLA-TV, 51 Va. Cir. 57, 61 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax
County); Messerley v. Avante Group, Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26, 27 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Rockingham
County).
19. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 250, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2004)); see also Act of Apr. 6, 2002, ch. 675, 2002 Va. Acts
973 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
20. Act of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 250, 2004 Va. Acts -(codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
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amendment's scope is very narrow-covering oral communica-
tions and lasting one day-therefore, its impact will likely be
minimal. The overall lack of modification to the statute makes
even the oldest cases examined in this survey relevant to a cur-
rent understanding of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17.
In the presence of an ambiguous statute and the absence of
binding precedent, differing opinions abound as circuit courts
weigh often equally persuasive arguments justifying various posi-
tions. As Judge Michael P. McWeeny concluded in Riordan v.
Fairfax Hospital Systems, Inc.,21 "[Ulntil the conflict can be re-
solved by the General Assembly or the Virginia Supreme Court,
this Court will view the problem with an eye toward Virginia
precedent ... rather than the trend in other jurisdictions."22
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 8.01-581.17
While questions abound regarding when application of the
quality assurance privilege is warranted, the mechanics of im-
plementation are not heavily disputed. According to Rule 4:1(b)(1)
of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the general scope
of discovery extends to any matter which is "reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."23 Limiting
free-for-all fishing expeditions, the discovery trolling net is sub-
ject to certain privileges. For instance, only that which is rea-
sonably calculated to reveal admissible evidence and is "not privi-
leged or otherwise limited by the Court" is discoverable.24 One
such privilege is the quality assurance privilege. Even it is not
absolute; Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 contains an exception
which allows for the discovery of documents when the court finds
good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances.25
The burden of establishing applicability of the privilege is on
the party seeking to prevent the discovery of the evidence, not the
21. 28 Va. Cir. 560 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Fairfax County).
22. Id. at 561.
23. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
24. Peterson v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 70, 71 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Fairfax
County).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B)(e) (Cum. Supp. 2004); see also discussion infra
Part VI.
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party attempting to procure the documents.26 "The party assert-
ing the protection of a privilege has the burden of establishing
both the existence and applicability of the privilege. Because evi-
dentiary principles operate to exclude relevant evidence and block
the fact-finding function, they should be narrowly construed."2"
Once the court finds grounds to apply the quality assurance
privilege, it may be possible to waive the privilege. Although
there are no published opinions finding that the privilege was
surrendered, the practitioner may find worthwhile fodder in such
an assertion. In Stevens v. Lemmie,2" the court found that if
waiver was possible, the privilege can only be waived as the work
product doctrine is waived-by disclosure to an adversary.29 In
HCA Health Services v. Levin,3" the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that the statutory privilege does not belong to a plaintiff
physician who is the subject of peer review and, therefore, the
privilege cannot be waived by him.31 While the court did not spe-
cifically address the merits of the waiver argument, the opinion
suggests that the actual holder of the privilege would be allowed
to waive the privilege.32
IV. DISCOVERABILITY OF HEALTHCARE POLICIES UNDER VIRGINIA
CODE SECTION 8.01-581.17(B)
The first category of documents to which the quality assurance
privilege is asserted is healthcare policies. Although these written
documents are variously termed "procedures," "protocols," and
"policy manuals," they collectively represent a consensus among
medical personnel and administrators to be treated as guidelines
of appropriate conduct for employees and independent contrac-
tors.33 Policies are typically the product of risk management and
peer review committees.34 "It is the searching self-critical analysis
26. Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57, 62 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Charlottesville City).
27. Levin v. WJLA-TV, 51 Va. Cir. 57, 59 (Cir. Ct. 2003); see also Wertenbaker v.
Winn, 30 Va. Cir. 327, 329 (Cir. Ct. 1993) (Albemarle County).
28. 40 Va. Cir. 499 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Petersburg City).
29. Id. at 512.
30. 260 Va. 215, 530 S.E.2d 417 (2000).
31. Id. at 221, 530 S.E.2d at 420.
32. See id.




by which performance is judged by one's colleagues or superiors
that characterizes the peer review. The purpose of such review in
the medical setting is to improve the efficiency of medical tech-
niques and procedures in the delivery of health care."3 Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.17(B) is often cited as providing the requi-
site justification for the policies' privilege.36
As noted above, circuit courts are equally divided on whether
policies are privileged from discovery.
The determination of policies' discoverability inherently re-
quires a balancing of an individual's immediate need for full dis-
closure with a less palpable continuing desire to improve patient
care for the Commonwealth's citizens at large. This balancing act
is at the heart of the debate surrounding the quality assurance
privilege. Two contemporaneous circuit court decisions demon-
strate the logical appeal behind the two positions.3 " In 1997,
Judge Jack B. Coulter found the rights of the injured party pre-
vailed in the balancing test, stating,
In the final analysis a balancing of interests is the critical test. What
are the benefits to be achieved in refusing disclosure against the
harm to the plaintiff that might thereby result. The records sought
35. Johnson v. Roanoke Mem'l Hosps., 9 Va. Cir. 196, 198 (Cir. Ct. 1987) (Roanoke
City).
36. Owens, 45 Va. Cir. at 99.
37. Some circuit courts have held that the policies are privileged from discovery. See
Head v. INOVA Health Care Servs., 55 Va. Cir. 43, 43 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Fairfax County);
Hurdle v. Oceana Urgent Care, 49 Va. Cir. 328, 328-29 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Norfolk City); Col-
ston v. Johnston Mem'l Hosp., 49 Va. Cir. 540, 540 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Washington County);
Roller v. Jane, 43 Va. Cir. 321, 322 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Albemarle County); Mangano v. Kava-
naugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66, 68 (Cir. Ct. 1993) (Loudoun County); Dunn v. Smith, 26 Va. Cir.
267, 267 (Cir. Ct. 1992) (Arlington County); Riordan v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 28 Va. Cir.
560, 561 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Fairfax County); Leslie v. Alexander, 14 Va. Cir. 127, 127 (Cir. Ct.
1988) (Alexandria City); Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va. Cir. 126, 128 (Cir. Ct. 1987) (Henrico
County); Taylor v. Richmond Mem'l Hosp., 2 Va. Cir. 224, 225 (Cir. Ct. 1984) (Richmond
City). In contrast, other courts have held that the policies are discoverable. See Saunders
v. Gottfried, 61 Va. Cir. 641, 642 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Chesterfield County); Day v. Med. Facili-
ties of Am., Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 378, 379 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Salem City); Bradburn v. Rocking-
ham Mem'l Hosp. of the King's Daughters, Inc., 45 Va. Cir. 356, 363 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Rock-
ingham County); Owens v. Children's Hosp. of the King's Daughters, Inc., 45 Va. Cir. 97,
100 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Norfolk City); Messerley v. Avante Group, Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26, 28 (Cir.
Ct. 1996) (Rockingham County); Houchens v. Univ. of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 202, 204 (Cir. Ct.
1991) (Charlottesville City); Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275, 277 (Cir.
Ct. 1990) (Fairfax County); Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 12 Va. Cir. 221, 222 (Cir. Ct. 1988)
(Richmond City); Sawyer v. Childress, 12 Va. Cir. 184, 188 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Norfolk City);
Johnson v. Roanoke Mem'l Hosps., 9 Va. Cir. 196, 202 (Cir. Ct. 1987) (Roanoke City).
38. See Johnson, 9 Va. Cir. at 196; Francis, 10 Va. Cir. at 126.
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are not the pure peer review proceedings that public policy might
justify in keeping secret. At issue are mere Job Descriptions and
Care Manuals. Disclosing their contents for discovery purposes
should not cause much harm to the hospital; it should not, and will
not, discourage their continuing and self-serving efforts to improve
health care .... The present question is will those who stand in the
shoes of the alleged victim, seeking recompense for his untimely
death, be hindered or helped under the modern liberal scope of pre-
trial discovery. When the input by one party to an issue in dispute
has been silenced by death, natural notions of fair play lean toward
opening rather than closing doors that might balance the contest.
The potential harm to the plaintiff in refusing the discovery sought
outweighs the benefit to the defendant in maintaining their se-
crecy.
In the same year Judge James E. Kulp's scales tipped toward the
rights of the citizens as a whole, noting,
On the one hand, there is the interest of persons, like plaintiffs, to
obtain the fullest disclosure in order to prove their case. On the other
hand, there is the interest of the public at large to receive the high-
est degree of health care possible within the limits of human capa-
bilities. In Virginia, the General Assembly has struck this balance in
favor of the public at large. The court has no rifht or authority to
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. 0
With their well-reasoned insights early in the debate, Johnson
and Francis greatly influenced later understanding of the nu-
ances of the quality assurance privilege. 41
A. Statutory Construction of Virginia Code Section 8.01-
581.17(B)
In addition to determining the balance between full discovery
and improved healthcare, the statutory construction of the qual-
ity assurance privilege is disputed. Regarding policies, the in-
quiry centers around the definition of "communications," as found
in Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17(B).42 The problem lies in the
statute's declaration that "[t]he proceedings, minutes, records,
39. See Johnson, 9 Va. Cir. at 205-06.
40. See Francis, 10 Va. Cir. at 129.
41. Several other courts have expressed their reluctance to rule in this area by judi-
cial fiat. See Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Charlottesville City); Dunn, 26
Va. Cir. at 267-68.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
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and reports" of certain committees and entities "together with all
communications, both oral and written, originating in or provided
to such committees or entities are privileged communica-
tions . . . ."" This statement has been interpreted in two alterna-
tive ways: (1) The phrase "proceedings, minutes, records, and re-
ports" acts to define "communications" and therefore the quality
assurance privilege extends only to those four items; or (2) The
"proceedings, minutes, records, and reports" along with oral and
written "communications" provided to the peer review committees
are protected. The differing analyses-termed the narrow ap-
proach and the broad approach, respectively-were aptly summed
up in Mangano v. Kavanaugh:44
The differing opinions from the circuit courts regarding § 8.01-581.17
have come in the interpretation of what constitutes "proceedings,
minutes, records, and reports" of the covered committees as well as
the intent of the legislature in limiting discovery of "all communica-
tions, both oral and written, originating in or provided to such com-
mittees." Some courts have taken a broad approach to the privilege
granted by § 8.01-581.17 and have held that communications such as
a hospital's policy and procedure manual are privileged from disclo-
sure, as well as hospital "Incident Reports" regarding a particular
patient's claim of injury resulting from medical treatment. On the
other hand, some courts have taken a more narrow approach and
have held that such communications are not privileged from the dis-
covery process.
45
The narrow approach, which finds that the policies are discov-
erable, is often justified by the statutory principle of ejusdem
generis.46 This doctrine states that when particular things are
listed by name and then followed by a more general word which
describes them, the general word is restricted in its meaning to
the enumerated, specific words.47 Take the following example:
My dog, Cassie, likes to eat bologna, salami, corned beef, and pas-
trami. Lunch-meats are her favorite treats.
43. Id.
44. 30 Va. Cir. 66 (Cir. Ct. 1993) (Loudoun County).
45. Id. at 67.
46. See, e.g., Day v. Med. Facilities of Am., Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 378, 379 (Cir. Ct. 2002)
(Salem City); Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275, 278 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Fair-
fax County).
47. See East Coast Freight Lines v. City of Richmond, 194 Va. 517, 525, 74 S.E.2d
283, 288 (1953) (explaining the ejusdem generis principle of statutory interpretation).
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Analyzed under the principle of ejusdem generis, the general term
"lunch-meat" is restricted to "bologna, salami, corned beef, and
pastrami." Thus, Cassie's favorite treats are limited to the four
enumerated meat by-products. It is assumed that her canine com-
pulsion does not extend to prosciutto and pimento loaf.
In Day v. Medical Facilities of America, Inc.," Judge Robert P.
Doherty applied the logic of ejusdem generis to explain that
[als the Supreme Court of Virginia states in Gates & Son Co. v. Rich-
mond, "[tihe rationale of the principle of ejusdem generis, seems to
be, that if the legislature had intended the general words to apply,
uninfluenced by the preceding particular words and without restric-
tion, it would in the first instance have employed a compendious
word to express its purpose." Similarly, if the legislature had in-
tended that all types of communications were to be protected by the
privilege provided by § 8.01-581.17, they could have simply stated
that "all communications" were privileged, without specifically list-
ing "proceedings, minutes, records, and reports" as examples of privi-
leged documents.
49
Courts have also opined that "communications" should be nar-
rowly construed in order to assure that the quality assurance
privilege is not boundless. For example, in Curtis v. Fairfax Hos-
pital Systems, Inc. ,5o the court noted,
Although the material technically might fall within the broad lan-
guage of the statute, such an interpretation would provide a limitless
privilege. Any ambiguities in the statute must be strictly construed
for, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "exceptions to the demand
for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively con-
strued, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."51
In comparison, the broad approach emphasizes that the statute
should be construed in its entirety and the words of the statute
should be given their plain meaning. The court in Mangano, after
considering both approaches, favored the broad approach over the
narrow:
This Court is of the opinion that § 8.01-581.17 should be read
broadly and that protection should be accorded all communications
originating from or provided to such medical committees. The Court
believes this broad approach is consistent with the objective of the
48. 59 Va. Cir. 378 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Salem City).
49. Id. at 379 (quoting Gates & Son Co. v. Richmond, 103 Va. 702, 705, 49 S.E. 965,
966 (1905)).
50. 21 Va. Cir. 275 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Fairfax County).
51. Id. at 277 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974)).
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statute which is to encourage health care providers "to adopt policies
and procedures which will provide the public with the highest degree
of care recognized by the medical and scientific communities at any
given time."5
Not only should the word "communications" be read in its plain
meaning, the intent of the statute should be taken into account in
construing "communications. ""
In determining that the quality assurance privilege extends to
defamation actions, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted the fol-
lowing:
When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need
for construction by the court; the plain meaning of the enactment
will be given it. Courts must give effect to legislative intent, which
must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction
would involve a manifest absurdity.
54
Although it is in dicta, the court noted that the language of
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 is unambiguous and, therefore,
the intent of the legislation should be given its full effect.55 This
intent, according to the court, was to promote free peer review ex-
changes with the goal of healthcare improvement. 56 This lends
support to a liberal interpretation of Virginia Code section 8.01-
581.17(B)'s description of "communications."
B. Admissibility Inquiry: Internal Company Rules Versus
Healthcare Provider Policies
Rule 4:1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia states
that the information need only be reasonably calculated to lead to
admissible evidence in order to be discoverable.57 When ruling on
whether a policy should be produced in discovery, many circuit
courts take the inquiry further and consider admissibility. While
this may appear to be the incorrect inquiry, considering admissi-
bility is probative of discoverability: if the policies themselves are
barred from admission, then how can they possibly lead to admis-
52. Mangano, 30 Va. Cir. at 68 (quoting Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va. Cir. 126, 128 (Cir.
Ct. 1987) (Henrico County)).
53. Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499, 507-08 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Petersburg City).
54. HCA Health Servs. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 220, 530 S.E.2d 417, 420 (2000).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 221, 590 S.E.2d at 420.
57. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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sible evidence? The wide discretion afforded to trial courts in
making this determination was recognized in Dunn v. Smith,5"
where the court ultimately found the policies at issue in the case
privileged.59
Even in dicta, Judge Coulter, in Johnson, admitted that measuring
the likelihood that discovery may lead to admissible evidence is left
to the "wide discretion of the trial court[.]" In Johnson, the court in
its use of that "wide discretion" found that "full and open discovery"
was the "order of the day" and allowed the plaintiff "opportunity to
explore the full potential of the documents at issue." However, this
court is unpersuaded by Judge Coulter's dicta and finds that in the
case at bar under Rule 4:1, discovery of the documents sought is not
reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.
60
The majority of courts that order production of the policies
agree that they are, nonetheless, inadmissible at trial.61 "The pri-
vate internal rules of a defendant cannot be admitted by or
against the defendant to negate or prove negligence. While the
manuals are inadmissible, the manuals are still discover-
able because the information contained therein is reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."62 At least
one circuit court, in Curtis v. Fairfax Hospital Systems, Inc., how-
ever, ruled that healthcare policies reflect industry custom and
are, therefore, admissible to show the provider's standard of
care. 
63
The inadmissibility of healthcare provider policies is premised
upon the holdings of Pullen & McCoy v. Nickens64 and Virginia
Railway & Power Co. v. Godsey.65 Pullen reaffirms the holding in
Godsey, where the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that internal,
58. 26 Va. Cir. 267 (Cir. Ct. 1992) (Arlington County).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 268 (quoting Johnson v. Roanoke Mem'l Hosps., 9 Va. Cir. 196, 201 (Cir. Ct.
1987) (Roanoke City)); see also Hurdle v. Oceana Urgent Care, 49 Va. Cir. 328 (Cir. Ct.
1999) (Norfolk City).
61. See Day v. Med. Facilities of Am., Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 378, 379-80 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Sa-
lem City); Bradburn v. Rockingham Mem'l Hosp., 45 Va. Cir. 356, 363 (Cir. Ct. 1998)
(Rockingham County); Owens v. Children's Hosp. of the King's Daughters, Inc., 45 Va. Cir.
97, 101 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Norfolk City); Messerley v. Avante Group, Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26, 29
(Cir. Ct. 1996) (Rockingham County).
62. Owens, 45 Va. Cir. at 101.
63. 21 Va. Cir. 275, 278-79 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Fairfax County).
64. 226 Va. 342, 351,310 S.E.2d 452,457 (1983).
65. 117 Va. 167, 168, 83 S.E. 1072, 1072-73 (1915).
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private rules were inadmissible to show the railway company's
standard of care.66 The logic underlying the Pullen and Godsey
decisions is extended to medical negligence cases by analogizing
railway company rules to healthcare provider policies. There is a
flaw, however, in the comparison. Unlike the typical negligence
action examined in Pullen and Godsey, Virginia Code section
8.01-581.20 requires the standard of care to be shown through
expert testimony in medical negligence cases.67 No such expert
testimony is needed for ordinary negligence actions.6" In Riordan
v. Fairfax Hospital System, Inc.,69 the court offers an explanation
for the incongruity's ramification:
Private rules and regulations were held inadmissible to establish the
standard of care in Virginia Railway and Power Co. v. Godsey.. .and
Pullen & McCoy v. Nickens .... Interestingly, these cases involved
the common law duty of reasonable care. It seems that the holding
ought to be accorded even greater weight when the legislature has
articulated the standard of care which is to govern. The inadmissibil-
ity of policy manuals is simply an extension of the time-honored doc-
trine barring evidence of repair following an accident when offered to
prove a prior defect.
70
The applicability of the Pullen and Godsey holdings has been
questioned; Curtis v. Fairfax Hospital Systems, Inc. and Johnson
v. Roanoke Memorial Hospitals urge that healthcare providers'
policies are not private company rules.7 Instead, these courts ar-
gue that policies are widely adopted standards promulgated by
the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Health Care Organiza-
tions. 72 Because healthcare provider policies are so widely ac-
cepted throughout the healthcare industry, these rules should be
admitted into evidence to establish the standard of care.73
66. Id. For a discussion of whether the plaintiff must be a party to the rules or poli-
cies, see Roller v. Jane, 43 Va. Cir. 321 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Albemarle County) and Leslie v.
Alexander, 14 Va. Cir. 127 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Alexandria City).
67. This is true unless the alleged medical issue is within the province of the jury,
such as in retained sponge cases. See, e.g., Beverly Enterprises v. Nichols, 247 Va. 264,
267, 441 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994).
68. See id.
69. 28 Va. Cir. 560 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Fairfax County).
70. Id. at 560.
71. Curtis, 21 Va. Cir. at 279; Johnson, 9 Va. Cir. at 199.
72. See Curtis, 21 Va. Cir. at 279.
73. Id.; see also Johnson, 9 Va. Cir. at 199.
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In the absence of a clear precedent regarding the admissibility
of healthcare provider policies, Judge Rosemarie Annunziata
looked to the trend in other states in declaring that
[t]he Virginia Supreme Court has not yet addressed the admissibility
of these materials into evidence and few courts outside Virginia have
addressed this issue. However, I note, first, that it appears that a
majority of the other jurisdictions which have addressed the issue
have determined the materials to at least be subject to discovery, if
not admissible .... Moreover, there is dictum from the Virginia Su-
preme Court's decision in Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645[, 222 S.E.2d
783] (1976), which implies that the materials sought may provide
some evidence of the standard of care.
74
Utilizing the same logic, Judge Paul Peatross reached the oppo-
site conclusion in Roller v. Jane71 in ruling that
[tihe Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that "private rules are
inadmissible in evidence either for or against a litigant who is not a
party to such rules." This has been the unwavering policy of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia since 1915. The rationale behind the Com-
monwealth's rule is not to penalize organizations for having higher
standards in their private organization than the law requires. Allow-
ing private rules to be admissible would encourage organizations to
adopt the minimal standard acceptable at law in order to avoid po-
tential liability. The Commonwealth has made a decision to favor
public good over the potential benefit to litigants and not allow the
private rules into evidence. Furthermore, in formulating this policy,
the Commonwealth has noted that the majority of jurisdictions allow
the introduction of private rules as evidence. Therefore, such a policy
mandate reflects an adoption of a strong state policy.
76
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for not allowing the
admission of healthcare provider policies into evidence is the ef-
fect it would have on the administration of care. As explained by
Judge James P. Kulp, "If health care providers were to believe
that their liability is going to be predicated by the standards they
impose upon themselves, they will invariably adopt minimal
standards. Such a circumstance would disserve the public's inter-
est by lowering the standards of health care available. " 77 Judge
74. Curtis, 21 Va. Cir. at 278-79.
75. 43 Va. Cir. 321 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Albemarle County).
76. Id. at 322 (quoting Pullen, 226 Va. at 351, 310 S.E.2d at 457).
77. Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va. Cir. 126, 130 (Cir. Ct. 1987) (Henrico County).
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Kulp also noted that if the policies were admitted into evidence,
they would likely confuse the jury.78
C. Depersonalized Character of Policies
The pervasive reasoning behind protecting the peer review
process is to encourage frank criticism of healthcare, thereby fos-
tering improvement. While this is an admirable goal, the question
remains whether the objective of improved healthcare can be
achieved while simultaneously allowing for sufficient discovery.
One possibility is to find that the policies themselves are discov-
erable but leave the process leading up to their creation privi-
leged. This compromise is premised upon the depersonalized
character of the policies.
It is the meetings, minutes and reports of such no-holds-barred in-
vestigations, the true peer review, that these statutes are primarily
designed to protect. But the ultimate end results of such critiques,
which might find their way into depersonalized manuals of proce-
dure and which have been shorn of individualized criticisms, does
not merit the same concern for protection from public scrutiny.
79
Because the policies are stripped of identifying information which
might embarrass the peer review subject and her critics, by this
logic, there is no harm in their disclosure.
The counterargument points to the wording of Virginia Code
section 8.01-581.17(B). The section's plain language states that
all communications which originate in the peer review committee
are privileged from discovery."0 According to the theory, health-
care provider policies are created in these committees and are
therefore privileged. Judge Thomas B. Horne opined that "[sluch
manuals, while they may be the end-product of confidential pro-
ceedings, are still communications originating from a committee
whose function it is to review, evaluate, or make recommenda-
tions on health care facilities and services. As such, they should
78. Id. at 129.
79. Johnson v. Roanoke Mem'l Hosps., 9 Va. Cir. 196, 199 (Cir. Ct. 1987) (Roanoke
City); see also Bradburn v. Rockingham Mem'l Hosp., 45 Va. Cir. 356, 363 (Cir. Ct. 1998)
(Rockingham County).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
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be given the protection accorded other confidential communica-
tions."81
Along a similar vein, it has been argued that because policies
are widely disseminated within healthcare facilities they are ipso
facto excluded from the quality assurance privilege. 2 Although
Judge T. J. Markow allowed the discovery of the policies, he re-
jected this argument in declaring that
[tihe court does not agree that "guidelines, rules, regulations, proto-
cols or recommended procedures for the Department of Anesthesiol-
ogy..." are proceedings, minutes, records and reports which are in-
tended to be protected from discovery based on its assumption that
these materials are the formalized rules disseminated to and ex-
pected to be followed by all persons covered by the rules, etc., and,
therefore, were never intended to attain a character of confidential-
ity. These materials do not qualify as privileged or otherwise pro-
tected from discovery. Such materials may not be relevant or lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence, but there is no way to deter-
mine that at this stage; therefore, discovery will be permitted. 3
Other arguments have advanced ways in which to undermine
the quality assurance privilege. In Day v. Medical Facilities of
America, Inc., the court found that the Virginia Administrative
Code allows nursing home residents and their families to review
the same policies sought and therefore there is no chilling effect
on improving nursing care." Similarly, in Houchens v. University
of Virginia, the court allowed policies to be discovered because
they were probative as to the control element of sovereign immu-
nity.85
V. DISCOVERABILITY OF INCIDENT REPORTS UNDER VIRGINIA
CODE SECTION 8.01-581.17(C)
The second type of document for which the quality assurance
privilege is asserted is the incident report.8 6 Judge Coulter ex-
plained,
81. Mangano v. Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66, 69 (Cir. Ct. 1993) (Loudon County).
82. See Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 12 Va. Cir. 221, 222 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Richmond City).
83. Id.
84. Day v. Med. Facilities of Am., Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 378, 379 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Salem
City) (citing 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-371-140 (2004)).
85. Houchens v. Univ. of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 202, 205 (Cir. Ct. 1991) (Charlottesville
City).
86. There are a few cases in which it is argued that the quality assurance privilege
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In reality, when an untoward event has occurred to a patient in a
hospital causing injury, hospital officials, keenly conscious of the liti-
gious nature of the American character, will undertake an investiga-
tion to accumulate facts so as to be fully informed if claim is ulti-
mately made. But such information is also sought in pursuit of the
hospital's noble objectives of remedying procedures or policies that
bring about accidents. The investigation is part of the hospital's pro-
gram of quality control.8 7
The debate surrounding incident reports is more straightforward
than that regarding healthcare provider policies. The question is
whether or not an incident report is a medical record kept in the
ordinary course of a provider's business, for then it would be ex-
empted from the privilege under Virginia Code section 8.01-
581.17(C).88 Thus, if an incident report is not a medical record, it
is protected. If it is a medical record, then it is discoverable.8 9
Similar to decisions regarding healthcare policies, circuit courts
are divided on whether incident reports are pfivileged from dis-
covery. Although there is a split among the circuits, more courts
have found incident reports to be protected.9 °
applies to documents other than policies and incident reports. See, e.g., Clements v. MCV
Associated Physicians, 61 Va. Cir. 673 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Richmond City) (finding that cre-
dentialing and the departmental file of a physician are privileged); White v. Cassady, 29
Va. Cir. 45 (Cir. Ct. 1992) (Fairfax County) (holding that the report of a review committee
is privileged in a defamation action).
87. Benedict v. Cmty. Hosp., 10 Va. Cir. 430, 437-38 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Medical Malprac-
tice Review Panel).
88. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(C) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
89. See id.
90. Some circuit court decisions have held incident reports privileged. See Saunders v.
Gottfried, 61 Va. Cir. 641, 641-42 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Chesterfield County); Stevens v. Lem-
mie, 40 Va. Cir. 499, 514 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Petersburg City); Mangano v. Kavanaugh, 30 Va.
Cir. 66, 70 (Cir. Ct. 1993) (Loudoun County); Houchens v. Univ. of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 202,
203 (Cir. Ct. 1991) (Charlottesville City); Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 12 Va. Cir. 221, 221-22
(Cir. Ct. 1988) (Richmond City); Riordan v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 28 Va. Cir. 560, 561
(Cir. Ct. 1988) (Fairfax County). Other decisions, however, have found these reports dis-
coverable. See Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57, 63-64 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Charlottesville City);
Hurdle v. Oceana Urgent Care, 49 Va. Cir. 328, 329 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Norfolk City);
McMillan v. Renal Treatment Ctr., 45 Va. Cir. 395, 397 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Norfolk City);
McGuin v. Mount Vernon Nursing Ctr. Assocs., 45 Va. Cir. 386, 386 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Fair-
fax County); Bradburn v. Rockingham Mem'l Hosp., 45 Va. Cir. 356, 360 (Cir. Ct. 1998)
(Rockingham County); Huffman v. Beverly Ca. Corp., 42 Va. Cir. 205, 216 (Cir. Ct. 1997)
(Rockingham County); Messerley v. Avante Group, Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26, 26-27 (Cir. Ct.
1996) (Rockingham County); Howell v. McDaniel, 52 Va. Cir. 526, 526-27 (Cir. Ct. 1994)
(Richmond City); Peterson v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 70, 72 (Cir. Ct. 1990)
(Fairfax County); Benedict v. Cmty. Hosp., 10 Va. Cir. 430, 434-35 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Medical
Malpractice Review Panel); Atkinson v. Thomas, 9 Va. Cir. 21, 22-23 (Cir. Ct. 1986) (Vir-
ginia Beach City).
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Many of the cases considering the discovery of incident reports
demonstrate the two-step analysis applied when determining if
an incident report is privileged. This analysis begins by examin-
ing the document within the confines of Virginia Code section
8.01-581.17(B) or Virginia Code section 8.01-581(C).91 If the inci-
dent report is a "communication" originating in or provided to one
of the specified entities, then it is protected.92 On the other hand,
if the incident report is a "medical record" kept in the ordinary
course of a healthcare provider's business, then it is discover-
able.93 The following is an examination of the factors which assist
circuit courts in making this decision.
A. Comparison of Incident Reports to Medical Records
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17(C) is often used to deny inci-
dent reports the protection of the quality assurance privilege.94
The subsection is designed to assure that the statute does not be-
come a roadblock to the discovery of patient records. "Medical re-
cords" are undoubtedly those items in the patient's chart-history
and physical, nursing notes, consultations, progress reports,
etc.-to which the patients have unfettered access. While there is
invariably some notation made in the chart, the incident report
itself is not kept there. In a typical scenario, if Elderly Ella rolls
off her bed while sleeping, the nursing note may read:
Patient found on the floor by aide at 22:00, complaining of pain in
her right hip. Assisted back to bed. Assured that safety rails are in
place. Tylenol 500 mg given for pain. Attending physician notified.
After Elderly Ella's x-rays the next morning reveal a fractured
hip, Risk Management dispatches an investigator to document
the event and determine its cause.95 At a minimum, the factual
scenario is recorded along with the names of those having knowl-
edge of Elderly Ella's fall. Quality Assurance recommendations
may be included.
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
92. Id. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
93. Id. § 8.01-581.17(C) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
94. Id.
95. In the absence of certainty regarding incident reports' privilege, one practice is for
the hospital to retain counsel and have him direct the investigation. This provides the
added protections of the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege.
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Although it may surface in peer review meetings, the incident
report is kept by Risk Management. It is this separate process
and placement which places the incident report in limbo between
a medical record, quality assurance device, and risk management
document.
Judge Jack B. Coulter helped to clarify the incident report's
role when he encountered the following argument: because the
goal of healthcare providers is to improve or maintain health, a
document which details a deviation therefrom cannot, by its very
nature, be a record kept in the ordinary course of business.96 In
response he wrote,
What are, or should be, records kept in the ordinary course of treat-
ing a patient or operating a hospital with respect to patients, that is
the ultimate question. The ordinary course of a hospital's function
surely includes the prevention of accidents or mishaps to those who
have been entrusted to its care. Charting the ordinary course of a pa-
tient's treatment would or should require description of events out of
the ordinary that relate to a patient's health and well-being. As a
health care provider, protection from further illness or injury is an
inescapable component of treating a patient.
97
Another justification for withholding the quality assurance
privilege from incident reports is the character of the document.
In Huffman v. Beverly California Corp.," Judge John J. McGrath,
Jr. ruled that incident reports are not only discoverable, they are
admissible.9 9 He reasoned that they did not rise to the level of
quality assurance documents because they are more akin to
medical records, which are specifically exempted from Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.17. ' In Bradburn v. Rockingham Memo-
rial Hospital,' Judge McGrath elaborated upon this comparison,
noting,
In the Huffman and Messerley opinions, this Court indicated that re-
cords such as these, which are standard incident reports that are
filed for any accident occurring at a medical facility, are not shielded
from discovery by the provisions of § 8.01-581.17 because they do not
96. Benedict v. Cmty. Hosp., 10 Va. Cir. 430, 435-36 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Medical Malprac-
tice Review Panel).
97. Id. at 436.
98. 42 Va. Cir. 205 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (Rockingham County).
99. Id. at 216-17.
100. Id. at 216.
101. 45 Va. Cir. 356 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Rockingham County).
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rise to the level as contemplated by the statute of being quality as-
surance deliberative documents. They are simply recitations of the
accident that occurred, the witnesses who were present, and other
objective facts that can be ascertained from the eyewitnesses to the
incident. As such, they are much more akin to the ordinary hospital
records, which are exempted from the reach of this privilege pursu-
ant to the last sentence of § 8.01-581.17.102
B. Comparison of Incident Reports to Communications
The excerpt from Bradburn demonstrates that Judge McGrath
paralleled incident reports and medical records because he did
not believe that the former should be categorized as a "communi-
cation" under Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17(B). 0 3 Several
other circuit courts have addressed the relationship between inci-
dent reports and protected communications. As compared to
courts which apply the ordinary medical record paradigm, these
courts tend to rule that the document is protected from discov-
ery." 4 The court in Mangano v. Kavanaugh illustrates this point,
noting,
The courts which have held that these reports are discoverable have
rationalized that they fall within the exception of § 8.01-581.17, that
is, they are "records kept with respect to any patient in the ordinary
course of business of operating a hospital. . . ." However, this Court
believes that such communications are clearly part of the confiden-
tial process envisioned by § 8.01-581.17 and must be protected from
disclosure. Indeed, a hospital's review and evaluation of a malprac-
tice claim is exactly the type of communication most deserving of
frank and open discussion without fear of public disclosure. 1
05
This concept was also explored by the court in Stevens v. Lem-
mie.' °6 Therein, the court addressed the inherent confusion posed
by the seemingly contradictory Virginia Code provisions in the
following manner:
The provisions of §§ 8.01-581.16 and 8.01-581.17 cause difficulty in
interpretation. On the one hand the protection afforded "all commu-
nications" appears to create a universe of coverage without limita-
102. Id. at 360.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Mangano v. Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66 (Cir. Ct. 1993) (Loudoun County).
105. Id. at 69-70 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(C) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
106. 40 Va. Cir. 499 (Cir. Ct. 1996) (Petersburg City).
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tion. On the other hand the provision that the statute shall not pre-
clude discovery of evidence "relating to hospitalization or treatment
of any patient in the ordinary course of hospitalization of such pa-
tient" appears to reclaim much of what was protected by the former
declaration. For example, procedures manuals and hospital protocols
"relate to" the hospitalization of patients.
Applying the interpretive doctrine of ejusdem generis, the term
"communications" must be limited in its application to the particu-
lars that proceed it, namely, the "proceedings, minutes, records, and
reports of any medical staff committee, utilization review committee,
or other committee as specified in § 8.01-581.16." 107
Interestingly, in applying this logic, the court reached the con-
clusion that the incident reports under consideration were pro-
tected from discovery. The court opined that the statute's intent
to improve healthcare through open quality assurance meetings
is best accomplished by protecting the reports. 1 8 The court in
Colston v. Johnston Memorial Hospital.9 hypothesized that Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-581.17(C) is merely a reassertion of the
existing law which assures patients access to their medical re-
cords.11° Although the Colston court was speaking of healthcare
provider policies, the court in Johnson v. Roanoke Memorial Hos-
pitals"' expresses counterarguments equally applicable to inci-
dent reports, noting,
Technically and semantically, these documents at issue may come
within the broad penumbra of "proceedings, minutes, records and re-
ports of any medical staff committee, utilization review committee or
other committee." Almost anything could come within such broad
and limitless sweep. But the real vitals of the statute's intent is not
at risk in the case at bar.
Beyond this analysis, however, the final phrase of § 8.01-581.17 can-
not be ignored and must be met head on. As read by this court, these
words practically eliminate any privilege that the preceding lan-
guage might grant.
107. Id. at 508 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2004)). Virginia Code
sections 8.01-581.16 and 8.01-581.17 are often lumped together in such inquiries; however,
the former only elucidates the latter insofar as concerns the construction of the covered
entities.
108. Id.
109. 49 Va. Cir. 540 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Washington County).
110. Id. at 541.
111. 9 Va. Cir. 196 (Cir. Ct. 1987) (Roanoke City).
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The defendant advances the classical argument that each and every
part of a statute should be given meaning and effect, and that to con-
strue the last phrase of the statute as taking away the privilege
granted in the first would render the statute meaningless. Such, it is
urged, is contrary to the basic rules of statutory construction, and so
it is. But then what meaning should be given to the last phrase? Is it
to be ignored? In what way or degree has its scope been limited?
12
It is worthwhile noting that one circuit court has created a disin-
centive to commingle risk management with quality assurance,
finding that, in the absence of strict barriers between the two, in-
cident reports are not shielded from discovery. 113
VI. EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO VIRGINIA
CODE SECTION 8.01-581.17
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 contains a fail-safe provision
applicable to the discoverability of both incident reports and
healthcare provider policies." 4 Communications which would oth-
erwise be protected by the privilege are discoverable if, after a
hearing, the court finds good cause arising from extraordinary
circumstances for the disclosure." 5 In other words, even if a docu-
ment is theoretically protected, there is an exemption acting to
temper potentially iniquitous applications. The fact that there is
an included mechanism to soften the statute's blow to unfettered
discovery undermines Judge Coulter's reasoning in Benedict v.
Community Hospital,"6 which found,
[tihe injured patient.., is at such an unfair advantage: one single
individual, sick and weakly, pitted against a colossal corporate giant
with staff and resources unlimited and personnel schooled in the
techniques of avoiding or minimizing losses for claimed negligence.
Already incapacitated and perhaps further damaged by the incident
and at the complete mercy of the personnel from whom she seeks re-
112. Id. at 199-200 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2004)); see also
Hurdle v. Oceana Urgent Care, 49 Va. Cir. 328, 329 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Norfolk City).
113. Eppard v. Kelly, 62 Va. Cir. 57, 60 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Charlottesville City).
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
115. Id. Courts have occasionally failed to apply this standard and instead have opted
for a lower bar. See, e.g., Levin v. WJLA-TV, 51 Va. Cir. 57 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax
County); HCA Health Servs. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 530 S.E.2d 417 (2000).
116. 10 Va. Cir. 430 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Medical Malpractice Review Panel).
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covery and relief, she is hardlyr in position to undertake critical in-
vestigation of what happened.
Perhaps the purpose of the extraordinary circumstances clause is
to rectify such inequities.
Unfortunately, beyond the bare words of the statute, neither
the General Assembly nor the Supreme Court of Virginia has
aided circuit courts in construing the meaning of "extraordinary
circumstances." One of the earlier opinions interpreting "extraor-
dinary circumstances" found that a plaintiffs unconscious state
when he was burned by heat lamps was insufficient to deny the
protection of the privilege.1 ' In Houchens v. University of Vir-
ginia, Judge Jay Swett noted,
There is little authority as to what constitutes "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" sufficient to justify an exception to the statutory privi-
lege that attaches to statements prepared for medical staff commit-
tees or utilization review committees. However, something more
must be shown than the fact that plaintiff was unconscious at the
time the treatment was rendered. The word "extraordinary" must be
given its plain meaning. This case would be different perhaps if
those who were witnesses to the event were no longer available and
their only version of the events were contained in statements pre-
sented to a medical staff committee. Those circumstances are much
closer to what the court believes was the intent of the legislature in
allowing such statements to be produced only under "extraordinary
circumstances."
119
At first blush, a medically induced unconscious state appears to
be an excellent reason to require the production of an incident re-
port, which would contain detailed events impossible for the
plaintiff to recall. Such a ruling, however, would render the qual-
ity assurance privilege nearly meaningless. The untoward events
forming the basis of medical malpractice actions often occur while
the plaintiff is in an altered mental state, be it due to shock, pain,
medication, sedation, etc.
The Houchens opinion notes that the opposite conclusion may
have been reached if no other sources of information existed. 20
This sentiment was reiterated in York v. Fairfax Hospital System,
117. Id. at 438.
118. Houchens v. Univ. of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 202 (Cir. Ct. 1991) (Charlottesville City).
119. Id. at 204 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
120. Id.
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Inc.,121 where the court found that extraordinary circumstances
did not exist where the names of other witnesses to the event
were produced.'22 On the other hand, the court in Peterson v.
Fairfax Hospital Systems, Inc.'23 found that difficulty in pursuing
a theory of liability constituted extraordinary circumstances. 124
This case involved an intruder who allegedly administered insu-
lin to a baby in the neonatal unit. 2 5
Although plaintiffs have deposed Hospital personnel, prior discovery
before the panel failed to produce any significant information con-
cerning the alleged criminal interloper. In order to pursue this line of
inquiry, the plaintiff must have the guidance that the material re-
quested would provide, and there appears to be no other available
source. Upon the oral arguments and briefs of counsel, the Court
finds the requisite showing for response under Rule 4:1(b)(3) has
been made despite the attorney work-product doctrine.
12 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia signaled disapproval of such an
interpretation of "extraordinary circumstances" when it stated
that the mere need to defend a suit does not meet the criterion. 27
Because it is often drafted shortly after the event in question,
the incident report is one of the best sources of information de-
scribing the facts of the accident. While courts recognize the
unique nature of the incident report, they are nonetheless divided
as to whether this alone justifies removing the quality assurance
privilege. In denying the privilege to an incident report which
contains no policy recommendations, the court in Hurdle v.
Oceana Urgent Care128 stated,
In a case such as this, I cannot think of a document more likely to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It will likely have been
produced by a person with the background and training to know
what questions to ask and what information to collect. The person
preparing the report is also likely to have access to those people most
121. 28 Va. Cir. 211, 212 (Cir. Ct. 1992) (Fairfax County).
122. Id.
123. 21 Va. Cir. 70 (Cir. Ct. 1990) (Fairfax County).
124. Id. at 72.
125. Id. at 70-71.
126. Id. at 72.
127. HCA Health Servs. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 221, 530 S.E.2d 417, 420 (2000).
128. 49 Va. Cir. 328 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Norfolk City).
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knowledgeable about the incident at a time the incident is fresh in
mind.
129
Judge T. J. Markow was not convinced by this reasoning. Recog-
nizing the two-year period between the accident and the discovery
phase of the suit, he wrote,
The court concedes that the quality of the information available to
the plaintiff now is probably not of the same quality as that obtained
by the hospital, but there is no reason to assume or believe that it is,
and will not be, the substantial equivalent. The rule does not allow
breach of the protection just because the material you can obtain is
not as good as that protected. It must be shown to be of substantially
inferior quality. That has not been shown here.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The debate surrounding the proper application of Virginia Code
sections 8.01-581.17(B) and (C) has created an interesting dichot-
omy. If a healthcare provider seeks to protect its policies, quality
assurance must take precedence over risk management. On the
other hand, if a healthcare provider seeks to protect its incident
reports, it must distance them from medical records by shrouding
them as risk management materials or quality assurance docu-
ments.
Clearly the most beneficial route for both healthcare providers
and patients generally is to emphasize quality assurance in the
creation of policies and incident reports. Not only does this ap-
proach insulate healthcare providers, it also benefits patients. It
is the individual litigant, however, who bears the concomitant
burden-she is injured anew by the denial of discovery of perhaps
the two most valuable additions to the case: healthcare provider
policies and incident reports.
In light of these competing interests, it is not surprising that
the circuit courts have divided evenly on the purpose, construc-
tion, and interpretation of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17.
With attractive logic on both sides of the debate, it will doubt-
lessly continue to rage until the Supreme Court of Virginia rules
definitively on the matters presented or the Virginia General As-
sembly clarifies the statute.
129. Id. at 329.
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